The Court of Appeal has just decided in Street v Derbyshire Unemployed Workers Centre that whistleblowers will only be protected if their main aim is to right a wrong that has occurred. The case essentially turned on the meaning of the requirement of 'good faith' in making disclosures in the public interest so that they are 'protected' disclosures under the legislation.

What were the facts of the case?

Mrs Street had worked as an administrator for the Derbyshire Unemployed Workers Centre from 1989 until January 2001, when she was dismissed after making a series of allegations of corruption against the manager, Mr Hampton.

In particular, she alleged that Mr Hampton had committed fraud by setting up a secret account, that he had made trips abroad during his working time for the centre for the benefit of other organisations, and that he frequently instructed her to do work for other organisations during her normal working hours.

The centre ordered an independent investigation, with which Mrs Street refused to co-operate. The subsequent report exonerated Mr Hampton, but criticised her failure to contribute to it.

The investigator described her as being 'at best misguided and at worst malicious' in her motivation. He stated that her allegations were unfounded and possibly required serious disciplinary proceedings to be taken against her. She was suspended and then dismissed, following a disciplinary interview.

Mrs Street claimed that she had been unlawfully dismissed under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. The tribunal dismissed her claim, holding that in making the disclosure, she had lacked the good faith required under the Act. Instead, it said she had been motivated by personal antagonism towards Mr Hampton.

In coming to this view, the tribunal said that one of her disclosures contained a passing reference to something that she knew to be untrue; that many of the matters about which she had complained had happened years ago; and that she had known about the secret fund allegation for months before doing anything about it.

The employment appeal tribunal upheld the tribunal's ruling and remitted the case back to the same tribunal for it to consider a claim of ordinary unfair dismissal.

What did the Court of Appeal decide?

The Court of Appeal agreed with the tribunals. It said that the primary purpose for the disclosure of information by an employee must be: 

  • to remedy the wrong which is occurring or has occurred 
  • or, at the very least, to bring the information to the attention of a third party in an attempt to ensure that steps are taken to remedy the wrong

In its view, the words 'in good faith' have a core meaning of honesty. But it said that even if the statement made is true or the employee reasonably believes it is true, the issue of honesty is still relevant. In other words, it matters whether the statement is made with sincerity of intention which is protected by the Act, or for an ulterior (perhaps malicious) purpose which is not.

In this case, the Court of Appeal said that it was reasonable for the tribunal and the EAT to decide that Mrs Street was motivated by personal antagonism, despite the fact that she believed that the disclosures she had made were substantially true.

The Court therefore concluded that it should be open to tribunals when looking at the question of good faith to conclude that an applicant was not acting in good faith if his or her predominant motivation was not to achieve the primary objective of righting a wrong, but was for some other ulterior motive.