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Beasley v National Grid Electricity Transmission

Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states that unfair dismissal claims must be presented to a tribunal within three months of the date of termination, unless it “was not reasonably practicable” for the claimant to comply within that time. In Beasley v National Grid Electricity Transmission, the Court of Appeal said that the time limit is strictly worded with the result that claims that are only a minute late will not be accepted.

Basic facts

After being dismissed on 7 February 2006, Mr Beasley had to submit his unfair dismissal claim by 6 May. Having received conflicting advice as to whether submitting a grievance would extend the period by 28 days, his solicitors advised him on 5 May to err on the side of caution and submit within the three month limit.

He filled in the form online on 6 May and sent it by e-mail to the tribunal at 23.44 that evening. However, because he typed the address wrongly, the e-mail was returned to him at 23.45. He then sent a test message at 23.47 to the correct address before forwarding the claim form which was received by the tribunal at 00.01.28 on 7 May - 88 seconds outside the deadline.

Tribunal and EAT decisions

The tribunal chair found against him, saying that Mr Beasley could not rely on the fact that he had received conflicting advice to explain his late claim form. He had received all the documentation indicating that the three month limit applied and had been told specifically on the day before that he should submit his claim immediately.

And unfortunately for Mr Beasley the EAT agreed. It said that although he was less than two minutes late in bringing his claim, the tribunal “had to apply the established principles” even though the employer did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the delay.

The EAT accepted that the decision must seem very harsh as he was only a few minutes late and very easy on employers “who are [then] excused from defending their actions by reason of a delay which has not prejudiced them in any way.” However because of the wording in section 111(2) of the 1996 Act and decisions in previous cases, it had to dismiss the appeal.

Court of Appeal decision

And the Court of Appeal agreed. It said that, having taken all the relevant information into account, it was clearly open to the tribunal to conclude that it was reasonably practicable for Mr Beasley to have got in his complaint on time between the Friday evening (by which time he could have been in no doubt what he had to do) and midnight the following day.

It pointed to the provisions of section 111(2) which, it said, were clear. Complaints must be presented within three months “unless the complainant can show that it was not reasonably practical to do so. If he cannot, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear his complaint. Either it is out of time or it is not. There is no grey area for complaints which are only a bit out of time”.

It accepted that “this was a harsh decision. With legislation less strictly worded this is a case which might easily have passed over a time bar on some equitable basis: the respondent was not prejudiced by the delay and 88 seconds is, in any event, neither here nor there. But the plain fact is that section 111(2) does impose a harsh regime. So do most time bars, which exist for the very good policy reason, that parties should know where they stand within a limited time of any dispute arising.”