Section 10 of the Equality Act makes clear that religion/belief, including philosophical belief, is one of the protected characteristics. In Gray v Mulberry Company (Design) Ltd, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that a philosophical belief has to have a certain level of cogency and more than one person has to be disadvantaged by virtue of holding that belief in order to be protected.
Basic facts
When Ms Gray started working for Mulberry in January 2015, she was asked to sign an agreement assigning the copyright of her work to Mulberry during the time she worked there. She refused on the basis that it might interfere with her own work as a writer and film-maker. Mulberrry then amended the agreement to make clear it only applied to work relating to the company’s business.
However, because she continued to refuse to sign the amended agreement, she was dismissed with notice on 16 September 2015. She brought claims of direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of philosophical belief under section 10 of the Equality Act, namely that she had “the statutory human or moral right to own the copyright and moral rights of her own creative works and output."
Tribunal decision
Relying on the test set out in Grainger plc v Nicholson (weekly LELR 147), the tribunal accepted that while Ms Gray strongly believed in the right of ownership to her own creative output, it did not accept that she held that belief as “any sort of philosophical touchstone to her life”. As it was not sufficiently cohesive to form a “cogent philosophical belief system”, it did not form a belief that fell within section 10 of the Act.
In case that decision was wrong, the tribunal went on to consider her claim of direct discrimination which it rejected on the basis that her dismissal was due to her refusal to sign the agreement. Apart from anything else, Mulberry could not have dismissed her because she held that philosophical belief as the company was unaware that she did.
As for the claim of indirect discrimination, the tribunal found the provision, criterion or practice (PCP) in question, namely the requirement to sign the agreement or be dismissed, had not put anyone else sharing her belief at a particular disadvantage. In any case, the requirement to sign the agreement was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting Mulberry’s intellectual property.
EAT decision
Dismissing the appeal, the EAT held that her belief had not attained the “necessary level of cogency or cohesion” to satisfy the requirements of the Grainger test, pointing out instead that “having a belief relating to an important aspect of human life or behaviour is not enough in itself for it to have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief”.
It also rejected her claim of indirect discrimination on the basis that there was no evidence of anyone else sharing her belief, let alone anyone suffering the same disadvantage as her. As she could not produce any evidence of any group disadvantage, she could not succeed in her claim.
Finally, the EAT held that, even if the tribunal had found that there was a philosophical belief giving rise to group disadvantage, it was correct to find that Mulberry’s imposition of the PCP was likely to have been proportionate.