Just and equitable

Department of Constitutional Affairs v Jones

A discrimination claim must be made within three months of the date of the act being complained about, although tribunals can extend the limit if it is just and equitable to do so. In Department of Constitutional Affairs v Jones (IDS 839), the Court of Appeal said that the time limit can be extended if the delay was caused by the claimant’s reluctance to accept his depression constituted a disability.

Basic facts

Mr Jones was suspended from his job as chief executive of the North Wales Magistrates’ Courts Committee (NWMCC) in July 2004 because of alleged financial irregularities.

Two investigatory meetings were cancelled because he was suffering from depression and had broken his ankle. However, a further meeting scheduled for January 2005 went ahead in his absence, despite three medical reports that he was unfit to attend and a request from his solicitor to adjourn it. He was found guilty of gross misconduct and dismissed with effect from 1 March 2005.

In April Mr Jones lodged claims for unfair dismissal and breach of contract. Then on 2 June he submitted two more claims and on 5 July a claim of disability discrimination.

Tribunal decision

The tribunal had to first decide whether it was just and equitable to grant Mr Jones an extension of time for his disability discrimination claim.

The tribunal chair took into account the fact that the disciplinary committee hearing the complaints against him was being disbanded on 1 April 2005. The proceedings could not continue after that date as Mr Jones would no longer have been employed by NWMCC.

Mr Jones successfully argued that he could not accept the fact that his depression would last 12 months and therefore constitute a disability, despite advice he had received from solicitors and his union that he had a disability. The Chair decided that had the committee postponed its hearing until Mr Jones was well enough to appear he would have presented his disability claim within time.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal agreed with the tribunal chair. It said that he had taken all the relevant factors into account when coming to his decision, in that he had considered whether the DCA might be disadvantaged by extending the time. The chair recognised there would be some prejudice because disability claims have no monetary cap, unlike unfair dismissal.

He also took account of the length of and reasons for the delay and decided that a period of five weeks was not substantial. As for “the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay”, he considered this to be negligible because the DCA were always going to have to defend the unfair dismissal case based on the same facts.

The Court also said that the chair was justified in coming to the decision that he did because of the combination of circumstances in this case. Firstly, Mr Jones had to predict whether his disability was likely to last at least 12 months. “Having given very careful consideration to the evidence, the Chairman concluded that that unwillingness on his part was the true reason for the delay which occurred.”

Secondly, it said that the process of discipline was hurried in that the committee brought the date of dismissal forward and “thereby the date by which a decision as to whether the respondent had a disability had to be made.” Thirdly, as the DCA was not prepared to accept that Mr Jones had a disability, it was difficult for them to argue that he should have acknowledged his mental illness.

Finally, it said that the chair was entitled to bear in mind the series of misfortunes which Mr Jones suffered which also made it just and equitable to grant the extension of time.