Peace v City of Edinburgh Council [1999] IRLR 417
The Court of Session in Scotland has added to the list of cases where the Courts have been prepared to grant injunctions to enforce obligations in the employment contract against employers.
Courts are usually extremely reluctant to do this, finding that workers have adequate alternative remedies before Employment Tribunals, notwithstanding that Tribunals are generally able to act only after the event and the levels of compensation are often meagre.
In Peace v City of Edinburgh Council, Mr Peace was a teacher employed by Edinburgh City Council. He was suspended pending an investigation into alleged professional misconduct, which, it was agreed, if proven, could lead to his dismissal. The employer wanted to use a new disciplinary procedure, allowing for investigation by a senior officer. Mr Peace wanted to have the benefit of what he saw as his contractual disciplinary procedure, which involved all material stages taking place before elected council members.
The issue for the Court was whether it had power to grant an interdict or injunction to prevent the employer using a disciplinary procedure of their own choosing, in breach of contract. The Council relied on Ridge v Baldwin, where the House of Lords confirmed the principle that the Courts will not compel performance of obligations under employment contracts - the worker instead has to rely on alternative remedies in damages. The Council, in essence, argued that the subsequent body of case law which has whittled away this principle was wrongly decided.
It was important to Mr Peace's success that his employment contract remained alive. Often, a worker will be seeking an injunction to keep her or his contract of employment alive after a dismissal. In that situation, Courts will inevitably scrutinise the relationship between the worker and the employer to see if the necessary trust and confidence still subsists so as to favour the grant of an injunction. In practice, it is all too easy for employers to compile sufficient reason why the necessary degree of trust and confidence no longer subsists so as to defeat the application for an injunction. Mr Peace was able to side-step this problem.
The degree of mutual cooperation was still important. In granting the interdict, the Court decided that it could enforce provisions in an employment contract where to do so would not impose any greater level of contact and cooperation than the parties were themselves able to accept. Mr Peace was to remain suspended during the disciplinary process, and all that was in issue was which disciplinary procedure should be followed.
The Court therefore granted the interdict.
Although Courts are slowly becoming more prepared to grant injunctions to enforce provisions in employment contracts, the circumstances in which they will do so are still rare. It will certainly be necessary to identify a contractual term that has been breached, either through dismissal or otherwise. The worker will then have to persuade the Court that she or he can not adequately be compensated in damages and that the necessary trust and confidence still subsists so that, on the so-called "balance of convenience", the Court should exercise its discretion. In practice, that will remain an uphill struggle.