The law says that it is indirectly discriminatory to apply a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) which seems to apply equally to everyone, but which puts someone from an ethnic origin at a “particular disadvantage”, when compared with others. In SG v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College, the High Court said that a uniform policy which prohibited a certain hairstyle for all pupils could amount to indirect race, but not sex, discrimination.
Basic facts
SG, who is of African-Caribbean ethnicity, had not cut his hair from birth in accordance with his family tradition. On starting St Gregory’s he was told that he could not attend because his hair (which he kept in braids, or cornrows) breached the school’s uniform policy.
Although the school allowed girls to wear their hair in cornrows, it did not allow boys on the basis that it was unconventional. As SG could not comply with the uniform policy not to wear cornrows, he went to another school.
He claimed that the policy was indirectly discriminatory because of sex and race.
High Court decision
It may be indirect discrimination when a PCP is applied equally to everyone, but puts those of the same race or ethnic or national origins at a particular disadvantage when compared with others not of the same race etc, and it cannot be justified. The Court said that the relevant PCP was the prohibition on boys below the sixth form wearing cornrows.
Applying the case of Eweida v British Airways Plc (which held that it is not enough to show that someone is personally disadvantaged), the Court found that SG had shown that there was a group who could be particularly disadvantaged by a refusal to permit them to wear their hair in cornrows.
The school argued that SG had to show cornrows were of exceptional importance to him in order to prove that he had suffered a particular disadvantage.
The Court rejected that argument but considered that particular disadvantage meant more than disadvantage. As SG was not prepared to have his hair cut and had suffered a traumatic experience by being turned away on his first day, it was satisfied that he suffered a particular disadvantage and therefore had been indirectly discriminated against.
Having found indirect discrimination, it rejected the school's arguments that a blanket policy could be justified, although it accepted that the aim of the policy (to keep the influence of gang and pop culture at bay) was legitimate.
Instead the Court said that, as the school accepted that religious reasons could justify non-compliance, without undermining the aim of the policy, it could see no difference in principle between that exception and SG’s case.
As for the allegation of sex discrimination, the Court referred to the decision in Smith v Safeway which said that a uniform code applying different provisions to men and women is not necessarily discriminatory if it applies a conventional standard of smartness and appearance. The Court agreed that although it was common for African-Caribbean boys and men to wear cornrows, it was not necessarily wrong for the school to regard them as unconventional.
Nor was it unreasonable for the school to have a policy requiring a conservative short back and sides for boys which was not applied to girls. Boys were not treated less favourably than girls just because they could not wear cornrows. SG had not, therefore, been discriminated against on the ground of sex.
Comment
Although this decision applies to a school’s uniform policy it is likely to have wider implications in relation to the test of indirect discrimination. In particular, the Court held that family and social customs can form “part of ethnicity”, and so fall within the scope of race discrimination. The case applied the law at that time under the Race Relations Act 1976 but will also apply to the Equality Act 2010. Furthermore, as an exception could be made on religious grounds an exception could also be made out where a genuine cultural and family practice made conforming to the policy impossible.