Historically the courts have said that ministers of religion cannot be employees, and that they therefore fall outside the scope of a lot of employment legislation.
In a ground-breaking decision, however, the House of Lords has said in Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission that the claimant was an employee under the definition of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975.
What were the basic facts?
Ms Percy, who was single, successfully applied for the post of minister in a Scottish parish in 1994. The committee overseeing the appointment sent her details of the "duties" she would have to carry out, as well as the "terms and conditions" (such as length of tenure and salary) that related to the post.
Three years later, however, she was suspended after she was alleged to have had an affair with a married parishioner.
The church board wrote to her a number of times before she resigned referring to her "employment" and suspension on full pay. She then claimed unfair dismissal and unlawful sex discrimination, on the basis that the church had, in the past, treated male ministers differently.
The tribunal dismissed her claims, saying that her complaints were "spiritual matters" that fell within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Church of Scotland. It said that her "contract" was not a contract of employment as defined in the unfair dismissal legislation or the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA).
She appealed against the decision that she had not been discriminated against, but the employment appeal tribunal and the Court of Session (the Scottish equivalent of the Court of Appeal) rejected her claim, saying that she did not have a contract of employment or "service".
Did she have a contract?
Ms Percy continued with the discrimination claim because the SDA (unlike unfair dismissal legislation) prohibits discrimination in relation to employment under "a contract personally to execute any work or labour" (a contract for services), as well as a contract of service. She argued that she had entered into a contract personally with the Board to execute work and labour in the parish.
And a majority of the House of Lords agreed with her. They said that the documentation between the two parties showed that Ms Percy had entered into a contract with the Board to provide services to the church on a set of agreed terms and conditions.
It clearly set out a number of aims and duties she was to fulfil in return for her salary and other benefits. In order to perform them she had "to execute work and labour." The dominant purpose of the contract was to secure her appointment to the office so that she could perform those duties personally.
Was she also an office holder?
Yes, according to the House of Lords. But they then went on to say that the fact that her status as an associate minister could also be described as an ecclesiastical office was irrelevant. Her rights and duties were defined by her contract, not by the "office" to which she was appointed.
Although clergy are servants of God, in the sense that God's word governs all that they practise, preach and teach, their Lordships said that does not mean that they cannot be "workers" or in the "employment" of the church.
Did the courts have jurisdiction?
Again, a majority of the House of Lords said they did. Although it recognised that the Church claimed exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of doctrine, worship, government and discipline, it said that the provision of a remedy for unlawful discrimination was a civil, not a spiritual matter.
Ms Percy was therefore entitled to have her claim heard by an employment tribunal.